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The High Cost of Investigations

AT last, at long last, there are signs that the conscience and common-sense of the American people may be stirring themselves to impose a brake upon the orgy of "investigations" which have been squandering public funds, diverting congressmen from their major responsibilities, preempting a disproportionate attention in the press, intimidating innocent and unimpeachably loyal citizens, and slowly permeating the national consciousness with ingrained habits of suspicion and distrust.

The comprehensive, moderate and weighty statement by the Association of American Universities on "The Rights and Responsibilities of Universities and Their Faculties" may be a straw in the wind. The mild furore in Congress which forced at least a temporary halt upon Representative Velde's threat to investigate the churches may reveal congressional awareness of a shift in the direction of prevailing breezes. The prohibition imposed by the Velde Committee on its own chairman against initiating further investigations except with the committee's authorization may indicate growing sensitivity to a slowly accelerating public indignation and disgust. It is high time for a careful appraisal of "gains" and "losses" from the plethora of public inquiries.

II

So far as we know, no one has yet attempted to compute the *financial* cost of recent investigations. With respect to governmental funds, that cost must be computed not only in terms of congressional appropriations but also in terms of man-hours of public officials, congressmen and others, whose time and attention have been deflected from essential national business. To that total must be added the cost in dollars, time and energy of organisations and individuals summoned for or threatened with investigation.

To take a single instance. In the case of the Cox Committee's investigation of foundations, the answers of one of the larger foundations to the Committee's 120-item questionnaire required over 800 typed pages of fully documented facts and carefully

framed opinions. The expenses of several foundations in preparing the required answers ran into 5 and even 6 figures. It has been estimated that the total cost to the 1500 foundations questioned may have been something in the area of 10 million dollars of philanthropic funds "diverted from the purposes of the founders" to satisfy congressional curiosity. It is safe to say that the resulting seventeen days of public hearings and shelf of compendious volumes still coming from the Government Printing Office disclosed hardly a fact bearing upon the alleged use of foundation resources for "un-American and subversive activities" which would not have been made available to any responsible inquirer in the offices of the foundations.

III

More serious than financial expense is the cost of congressional investigations to the *efficiency and integrity of government*. Reference has already been made to the demands upon congressmen for time and energy diverted from their primary obligations. Is this the use to which the citizens desire their representatives to put already overtaxed energies? If the sole aim were to ferret out and reveal genuine threats to the safety of the nation, no one would question either the propriety or the usefulness of congressional inquiries. But is it? Certainly, nothing in the character and records of the principal instigators or in the chosen manner of conducting their investigations is calculated to reassure the public conscience on that point. Party and personal political advantage appear only too obviously as ill-concealed motivations. In any event, the American people need to realise that, in the eyes of the world, the current procedures are rapidly making this aspect of their government something of an international laughing-stock not to say scandal.

The declaration of the Association of American Universities rightly insists that "freedom" or "privilege" for the individual scholar is qualified by "obligations" and "responsibilities." Does this rule apply only to citizens and not to their representatives

in government? Is the freedom of investigation which legislators enjoy unqualified by the obligation to "responsible" use of that freedom, obligation to scrupulous truth-telling, to abstention from dissemination of rumor and innuendo, to protection rather than debauching of the honor and good-repute of private persons and institutions? Can the citizen be expected to practice the rule of cooperation with government if his honesty is likely to be employed by agents of government illegitimately and irresponsibly for his discredit? The university presidents enjoin teachers not to evade giving testimony before government committees by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Is the citizen to surrender his protection against self-incrimination while congressmen safeguard themselves against prosecution for dissemination of libel and slander by invoking "congressional immunity"?

IV

Gravest of all, however, is a "cost" of the current epidemic of official inquiries which, though subtle and intangible, may prove ultimately the most injurious to national health—the effect upon *basic national attitudes* of perspective, of good sense, of confidence of citizens in one another and their organizations, even of confidence in the integrity and trustworthiness of their own government. The popular mind is peculiarly susceptible to the often-specious aphorism, "where so much smoke . . . surely some fire."

Of this danger, likewise, the recent examination of foundations may serve as illustration. To a conscientious and careful appraisal, the upshot of that inquiry was a 99 44/100% vindication; and as much is admitted in the Committee's official report. But how many who read the newspaper accounts of the inquiry, directed as always to highlight the sensational and "newsworthy," have studied the report or know its conclusions? An expert on public opinion believes that the foundations "gained on the editorial pages," but points to the frequent juxtaposition in the headlines of the terms "foundations," "reds," "subversives," etc. and the probable net effect upon general attitudes. Probably not one person reads editorials for every hundred who absorbs his impressions from headlines.

Judge Learned Hand's widely quoted *confessio* strikes a true balance between gains and losses in this matter in two sentences:

"I believe that that community is already in the process of a dissolution where each man begins to eye his neighbor as a possible enemy, where non-conformity with the accepted creed, political as well as religious, is a mark of dis-

affection, where denunciation, without specification or backing, take the place of evidence."

"Risk for risk, for myself I had rather take my chance that some traitors will escape detection than spread abroad a spirit of general suspicion and distrust, which accepts rumor and gossip in place of undismayed and unintimidated inquiry."

V

Excessive and irresponsible congressional investigation has become a national peril as well as a national scandal, demanding public attention and publicly-determined constraint.

As the elected representatives of the people, Congress shares with the Executive and Judiciary the duty of safeguarding national welfare and exposing genuine threats to national safety. Responsible investigation is a proper instrument for discharge of that duty. But it is a powerful and potentially vicious instrument. It should be exercised within self-imposed limitations, which might include the following:—

1. All investigations to be by regular standing committees of the Houses, fully representative of their memberships, never by ad hoc committees of self-appointed guardians of the public weal.

2. Public hearings to be only *after* proof of disloyalty, not for the possible discovery of disloyalty.

3. All investigations to be conducted fully in accordance with established judicial procedures, including the presumption of innocence, right of legal advice and representation, etc.

4. The removal of congressmen from protection, under "congressional immunity," from legal responsibility for public statements which otherwise would be subject to recourse in the courts.

H. P. V. D.

Editorial Notes

IT becomes daily more apparent that Stalin's death is resulting in a radical shift in Soviet policy. The freeing of the accused Kremlin doctors and the jailing of their accusers is the mark in internal policy of the shift. More important to us are the marks in foreign policy: the relaxation of the "cold war" in Germany, in the truce talks of Korea, the election of a secretary-general in the United Nations, and the softening of the propaganda war.

It is not yet apparent whether the shift is due to Malenkov's superior tactical skill or to the increasing influence of the army in the Soviet power structure.

It will be remembered that Malenkov rose to power before Stalin's death, over his chief rival, Zhdanov, who represented Leninist-Communist dogmatism as contrasted with Malenkov's freedom from all preconceptions which would hinder the power struggle of the Soviet state.

On the other hand, Malenkov may not be the significant figure at all. It is apparent that the army in the persons of Bulganin and Zukov (the latter a war hero cashiered by Stalin after the war and now returned to significant power) has moved into a central position of power and it would appear that Soviet power structure now represents an alliance of the three oligarchies, of the party apparatus, the police, and the army.

Whatever these facts may be, the consequences of the shift in power are enormous. The most obvious consequence is the dissipation of the fear of imminent war throughout the world. We might remind the proponents of a preventive war of these unexpected events so that they may learn how false it is to regard anything as inevitable in history.

On the other hand, the superior tactical skills of the new Soviet overlords confronts the free world with new dangers. They will be able to sow discord among the free nations more easily, under the new conditions than under the old. From the days of the Marshall Plan to the outbreak of the Korean war, Stalin had the habit of forcing us to a wiser and more generous statesmanship than we would have been inclined to pursue by confronting us with a stupid intransigence which obscured our own blunders. The Soviet overlords must know that there are American Congressmen who are hell-bent for tax reduction even before the Budget is cut, and who will not be restrained now that the pressure of fear has been removed. The Administration does well to accept all peace overtures as *bona fide* until they are proved false. But meanwhile, we can not forget that the Communist tyranny has not altered its nature, that the Communist threat has not evaporated and that the tactical skill of the new Communist leaders places the statesmanship of the free world on trial as never before.

R. N.

French Neutralism

VERNE H. FLETCHER

DURING the past months Western Europe has been trying to guess what it will mean to have Eisenhower in the White House. At first disillusioned with the election results, then apprehensive at the solemn promises of "liberation" and not totally convinced that this could be accomplished as indicated without firing a shot, European observers today see Eisenhower hesitating between two policies: either "more of the same" or "the same, only more so." Nevertheless, a goodly number of proposals which have been made in the President's entourage are far from reassuring, especially as the new government feels it must "do something." This uncertainty has tended to bring more clearly into focus the elements of discord in American-European relations. At the same time it is obvious that the new leaders of the "free world" are not quite sure just what strategy to use with their European protégés. At any rate, London has left no doubt that in spite of American pressure she does not intend to abolish the English Channel nor to renounce her claim to have something to say in the Far East. Bonn on the other hand, or at least the Chancellor, is rather elated with the prospects of collaborating with the sympathetic men now in Washington. But the French government, first blowing hot and then cold, must seem both impossible and exasperating to the Atlantic strategists.

Scarcely veiled by diplomatic politeness, bad feeling between the United States and France is deepening. One recent if trivial example of this, was the incident caused by the rather unflattering descrip-

tion of French politics which appeared in *Life*. This article, though superficially speaking not too far off, ignored the deep underlying reasons for the current confusion in French political life: namely and in summary fashion, that capitalism and bourgeois liberalism have failed in France, and that no coherent and constructive alternative has yet been able to maintain itself. Furthermore *Life* seemed completely unaware of the extent to which "Atlantic politics" itself is making it impossible to redress the political and social situation in France and is subsidizing those very elements which are discrediting and weakening the nation. That there is a realistic alternative to France's present vacillating politics is what this article will hope to show. The readers of *Christianity and Crisis* and American liberals in general have every reason to give sympathetic consideration to this oft-misrepresented alternative which is known as "Neutralism."

The term "neutralism" itself is rather unfortunate for it suggests a certain indifference, a certain hesitancy to commit oneself, which is not compatible with the responsibilities of a great nation. The term "independence" is often preferred today as less ambiguous and probably its best definition was that given by the deputy de Chambrun: "independence of action to work for peace." Thus "neutralism" or "European independence" is not presented as the "solution" to the cold war but as a positive effort to modify the antagonism of the two blocs, based on the conviction that "coexistence" is possible. If in this article the term "neutralism" is

always placed between quotation marks, it is in order to remind the readers that for those peoples living in this part of the world it is not a "neutral" affair but a matter of life and death. "Neutrality" is the expression of France's will to survive.

Obviously we are not dealing with the position of classical neutrality for "neutrality" is a peacetime strategy, that is an effort to avoid war. In order to understand the "neutrality" point of view it is absolutely essential first of all to comprehend her "point of viewing"—and this from a double perspective: historically, France has never recovered from the last war which for her meant an occupation and practically a civil war geographically, France, and all of Western Europe for that matter, could scarcely get out of the way if the two big antagonists should decide to have it out. Given the French "situation" it is inevitable that her view of things be radically different from the "Atlantic view of things" inspired by the totally different American "situation."

Consequently, things don't look the same on both sides of the Atlantic—nor do they sound the same. Take for example certain words spoken by Dulles on the 15th of January 1952 before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee: (re-translated from the French) "Europe is extremely important because of her potential in men and material. The United States cannot and should not tolerate her falling into hostile hands." Is it unreasonable that Europe considers herself important for other reasons than her war potential? From here these words look like further evidence of the tendency of American foreign policy to reduce everything to military terms. Americans can permit themselves to discuss How to Win the Next War and how to organize the "post-war period." But in France the question, and the fundamental one, is How to Avoid War since for France there would be no "afterwards." It's as simple as that. The "will to survive" by which the writer has described French "neutrality" does not refer to the hot but to the cold war.

It is the Atlantic Pact of the cold war which is France's present danger for "Atlantic politics" and all that it entails, is threatening France's very existence as a liberal democratic country. For a France whose economy is on the verge of collapse because of impossibly heavy military expenses and because of the continuation of the insane and endless war in Indochina, can be no real defense against communism since in reality this situation can only increase the seduction of communist claims for a vast sector of the French public which is feeling more and more the pinch of a steadily declining standard of living. At the same time, this situation, let it be stated clearly, is threatening to push France toward a neo-fascist regime: the police already feel free to act arbitrarily, a new Marshall is being

groomed and experienced Vichy men are ready. The sane elements in French public life, trying to reverse the reactionary trend of present political developments, find at every turn the connivance of "Atlantic politics."

The Atlantic Pact, which would sacrifice everything (except American business interests) to the remilitarization of Europe, could only make sense if there existed an imminent danger of war. In France, however, no one in informed circles believes in the "Soviet menace" as far as a military attack of Western Europe is concerned. And despite what is being said for popular consumption in the States, it is doubtful if informed Americans expect any immediate Soviet offensive. It would of course be ridiculous to pretend that Soviet Russia never resorts to armed force in order to accomplish her purposes, but it is well-known that Russia needs peace in order to realize her own economic and social potential—and that not for a few years but for decades. Furthermore she believes that time is working for her and that "ideological warfare" is accomplishing, in Asia especially and perhaps soon in the Arab countries, what "military warfare" would be powerless to accomplish. Of course, she believes in "helping history along" but prudently and not at the expense of a general war against the United States which she knows would mean the end of Soviet Russia as a "socialist experiment."

But though a Soviet military menace does not now exist in Western Europe, the situation is by no means static. Indeed the greatest concern of "neutrality" is that through fear, cowardice, and disunity the French people will not be able to regain control of their own destiny in time to modify the direction of events in Europe, for Russia's desire to avoid a general war could become secondary to her fear of Western aggression. "Neutrality" has warned for a long time against the "factor of provocation" (see Bourdet's article in the *Nation* — 12/16/50), and has pointed out that the integration of Western Germany into the Atlantic bloc could be in the eyes of Russia an act of aggression which she would not tolerate. This is the significance of the Russian proposals on Germany of March 1952. This is what is now at stake in the matter of the "European Defense Community" and the reason why certain European countries are reluctant to fall in line. "Neutrality" claims are now becoming more intelligible to many Frenchmen who, formerly lulled to indifference by Democratic diplomacy, are suddenly pricking up their ears at the Republican motto, "Trust God and deal straight from the shoulder."

Let us now discuss the question: Who are the "neutrality" and how wide is their influence? In an attempt to clarify the picture, we are proposing the following two terms: "situational neutrality" and "consistent neutrality." The French "situation" and

"point of viewing" have already been defined sufficiently to indicate the circumstances which prepare a favorable soil for "a certain degree of neutralism." It can be safely affirmed that a large majority of the different sectors of French opinion espouse *certain aspects* of the "neutralist" point of view though often in a vague, imprecise and ambiguous manner and though sometimes calling it by another name. At the same time it can be said that only those elements of the French bourgeoisie who were more or less at home in the atmosphere of the Vichy regime are totally impervious to "neutralist" ideas. Thus "situational neutralism" covers a lot of territory, but the only common denominator which could unite these disparate elements is a general realization that France has gone too far in submitting to "Atlantic politics" and consequently must regain a certain independence.

"Neutralist" themes are seen in many distorted forms. On the extreme left, "U. S. Go Home" anti-Americanism does not evidence an equal antipathy for the pressure on French internal politics emanating from Moscow. On the extreme right, certain Gaullists oppose the Atlantic Pact because — it is humiliating to French pride. Certain members of the Radical Republican party, notably Herriot and Daladier, are opposed to the European Army but for nationalistic and anti-German motives. Most of the MRP favors a certain modification of colonial policy but at the same time supports the European Army. And so on and so on—Thus what we are calling "situational neutralism" reflects a myriad of conflicting group interests and narrow ideologies which obviously cannot create a unified public opinion and a coherent program.

Does a coherent program exist in France? Where can a "consistent neutralism" be found? "Neutralism" is not a political party or movement but it could become the basis of a new political coalition. There are "neutralists" in all moderate political groups: progressives, socialists, demo-catholics (MRP), and radicals. There are "neutralists" among writers, artists, teachers, journalists and other liberal professions. But the question is not how many "adherents" there are but rather whether a coherent and articulated program exists susceptible of being a rallying-point when the propitious moment presents itself.

The authentic voice of "consistent neutralism" is the weekly journal "*L'Observateur*," which was founded three years ago with the purpose of "giving to men belonging to different sectors of opinion a useful instrument of information and of political reflexion." "Consistent Neutralism" was born with the *Observateur* though the idea of "neutralism" itself had been enunciated several years previously, notably by Claude Bourdet, founder and editor of the *Observateur*, and by Beuve-Mery, editor of

Le Monde (for the latter see the *Nation* 8/16/52, and for the former, 12/6/52). Bourdet, seconded by a coherent team of first-rate journalists, formed during the Resistance, have not ceased to develop "neutralism" into a weapon of criticism and a consistent political program.

The case of the *Monde* is somewhat of an anomaly. It has been called "la bourgeoisie faite journal" and its journalism is incontestably conservative. But all the same, the *Monde* has been a proponent of "neutralism" since 1949 (Atlantic Pact). Beuve-Mery's political perspicacity is illustrated by his famous statement made in 1949 that the rearmament of Germany was contained in the Atlantic Pact "comme le germe dans l'oeuf." Remember that at the same time Robert Schuman was saying, "To claim that German rearmament will result from the Atlantic Pact is a monstrosity." Last summer in his *Nation* article mentioned above, Beuve-Mery made another statement which is proving equally prophetic to the effect that the rearmament of Germany is today's "Munich," that is to say, the point from which there would be no turning back. But on the other hand the *Monde* hesitates to draw the logical political conclusions and seems to hope that somehow the present French ruling class will come to see the light. Thus its "neutralism" is compromised for—and it is important that this be re-emphasized—though not a revolutionary program, "consistent neutralism" must be "radical," that is, uncompromised with outworn political positions and not obliged to defend any invested interests. In other words, "neutralism" cannot succeed politically without popular support; indeed there must be developed a new left-center coalition as in 1936 and the immediate post-war period.

To develop methodically the fundamental positions of "neutralism" would take an article in itself, and moreover most of these positions have already been mentioned. However it is necessary in conclusion to emphasize two points of particular urgency: the Indochinese war and the "European Army." As a matter of fact, these two problems are now inseparable not only technically—the men, arms and financial resources being swallowed up in the Orient would put France at a tremendous disadvantage in a "European Army"—but also politically for it is obvious (and revolting) that one of the master-ideas of the Mayer-Bidault government is to strike a bargain with Washington: the ratification of the EDS treaty for the internationalization of the conflict against the Vietminh (and, thrown in for good measure, hands off in North Africa so that French colonial repression may continue). There is reason to believe that Washington would not be completely averse to such an agreement.

No one of the "neutralist" themes would make a better showing in a national referendum than that

which calls for an end to the war in Indochina. French interests in that corner of the world can be reduced to the "interests" of a few thousand Frenchmen: profiteers, including army officers and colonial officials as well as "legitimate" business men, and a small group of bitter-end politicians. One had only to follow the Indochinese budget debate in the Assemblée Nationale several months ago to be convinced that the "affair" has next to no support. Militarily a stalemate, economically a catastrophe, its continuation progressively weakens France's position in Europe.

The increasing hostility of the Vietnamese themselves may be judged by the recent invitation of Letourneau to all who were not sincere supporters of the franco-baodaiste regime to go fight with the Vietminh. He is obviously annoyed with the "attentisme" with which he is surrounded on every hand (a sort of "wait-it-out" policy for which the Vietnamese have had centuries of training). Further evidence is offered by the municipal elections of January which were meant to show that the Tam government is democratic and has popular support. Though the elections were carefully staged (only one village in three even in the area under Franco-vietnamese control was considered sufficiently "pacified" to vote), opposition candidates were elected in Haiphong and Saigon.

The fallacy of the thesis that "internationalization" would solve the problem in Indochina or would lighten France's burden there was well pointed out both by the *Monde* and the *Observateur*. On the one hand, if negotiation between France and the Vietminh is still possible though increasingly difficult, negotiation between the United States and China is excluded. On the other hand, given the Republican thirst for action, America's direct participation would actually foreclude any reduction of France's military effort in the Far East. Indeed the Republican "common front in Asia," toward which France is being oriented by Marshall Juin's present visit to Korea and Indochina, risks to drag France into strange and perilous adventures. "Defending the Free World" surely takes on curious forms.

No less curious and dangerous is the euphemistic "European Defense Community," which is designed, as everyone knows, to sugar-coat the bitter pill of a new Wehrmacht. But as the French deputies are familiarizing themselves with this vast and complicated document called the Treaty of Paris, they are discovering that the sugar doesn't go beyond the title and that not only does the "treaty" permit the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht but it even consecrates its preponderance in the "European Army."

We will only take space to mention three details of the treaty: 1—All elements of a full-fledged German Army, including a general staff, are permitted by the treaty. 2—In addition Germany would

eventually profit from the system of the "weighted vote" whereby an inequality in military expenses and in military strength would be translated into a corresponding inequality of voting power. A rather quaint detail in the calculation of the "weighted vote" is that while Bonn's expenses for the maintenance of the Allied occupation forces are counted as "military expenses," the heavier expenses of France in Indochina are not included. 3—The EDC's highest authority, the Commissariat—composed of delegates from each member state, which nevertheless can give no instructions to its delegates—is in the final analysis answerable to the NATO and thus to the Pentagon. It is indicative of the opposition growing in France that Jules Moch, uncompromising opponent of the treaty "in its present form," was chosen by the foreign affairs committee as its "reporter" to the Assembly. The "protocoles annexes" which are meant to soften what France considers to be its harshest features, would only serve to hopelessly confuse an already tortuous document and would actually result, when all the talk is over, in the "legalized" preponderance of the strongest party.

It is undeniable that many unemployed Nazi generals and SS officers are looking forward impatiently to their new jobs. The truth is, as was pointed out by the *Monde* (Jan. 16), that rearmament plays into the hands of those who would put back into position "the social and mental atmosphere in which formerly National Socialism came to power." And the *Monde* concludes, "Let us take care that by giving 'European contingents' to Chancellor Adenauer we do not wake up one day with the Wehrmacht of a new Hitler."

"Neutralism," let it be said clearly, is not simply against the EFC as now proposed but opposed to any defense strategy which includes the rearmament of Germany. "Neutralism" believes that Russia is prepared to make real concessions to avoid a militarized West Germany integrated into the Atlantic bloc. "Neutralism" believes that first in order of importance is a general negotiation with Russia (though fully realizing that such a negotiation would be arduous and require compromises) with as its primary purpose the agreement on a "neutral," unarmed, unified Germany. Such a Germany would be more of a guarantee against aggression than a "European Army," for Russia would then know that an attack on Germany would inevitably bring on a general conflict. On the other hand, the primary goal of a West Germany Army would be the recovery of her lost provinces (Adenauer said so). Such a goal would coincide with the Burnham-Dulles campaign of liberation in which, according to Burnham, military action would be used when indicated!

Placed before these two alternatives, "Neutralism" cannot hesitate for "The Issue Is Survival."

The World Church: News and Notes

German Communists Crack Down on Evangelical Youth Groups

Berlin (RNS)—East German authorities have cracked down on Evangelical Church youth organizations in a series of actions throughout the Soviet Zone.

High school and college officials were forced by Communist officials to call mass meetings at which students were given the choice of signing statements that they would sever their relationship with such Church movements or being expelled.

The meetings were supervised by officials of the East German State Security police, the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party and the Freie Deutsche Jugend (Free German Youth), Communist youth movement.

High school and college students known or believed to be members of Junge Gemeinde (Young Community), the Evangelical organization for teen-agers, or Studenten Gemeinde, the Church movement for university students, were called up before the mass meetings and handed mimeographed statements to sign.

In Brandenburg City and in the Berlin suburb of Koenigswusterhausen alone more than 100 students who refused to sign it were ousted from schools.

Communist officials in several school districts issued orders forbidding students to wear the "cross-on-globe" badge of the Junge Gemeinde and directing members of the Church organization to report to local police stations every third day.

Meanwhile, three other developments in the Soviet Zone anti-Church campaign were reported.

Vicar Johannes Althausen, a leader of the Studenten Gemeinde, was arrested in Brandenburg.

East German authorities confirmed reports that they had seized the deacons training center operated by the Lutheran Church of the Province of Saxony in Mansfeld Castle, near Eisleben.

The Communist East German News Agency, A.D.N., charged that the center conducted "anti-State activities and harbored illegal elements." It said that, "in harmony with the wishes of the population," Mansfeld Castle will be converted into a recreational and cultural center for workers in the nearby Wilhelm Pieck Iron Plant.

A scheduled meeting in East Berlin of the Nordic German Konvent had to be shifted to West Berlin when Soviet authorities refused several Scandinavian clergyman entry permits to East Berlin. The organization is a Protestant churchmen's group interested in promoting an informal relationship between German and Scandinavian Churches.

Entry permits were granted only to Bishop Johannes Smemo of Oslo, Primate of the Norwegian State Lutheran Church, and Bishop John Olof Cullberg of Vasteras, Sweden.

Another Evangelical Church Official Disappears

Berlin (RNS)—An Evangelical Church official sent to Communist-controlled Saxony to investigate the seizure of a Lutheran training center by Soviet Zone authori-

ties has "disappeared" and is believed being held by East German security police.

Evangelical Church spokesmen identified the missing official as Deacon Fritz Hoffman of Magdeburg, head of the Church's young men's organization and long prominent in its youth work in East Germany.

They said he had been sent to Eisleben, Saxony, at the request of the Lutheran Church in the Province of Saxony to clarify the status of a training center for deacons conducted by the Church in Mansfeld Castle near Eisleben.

The center was raided April 2 by police and agents of the East German State Security Ministry who arrested its students and faculty and took over control of the institution. The students were later released, but its Senior Deacon, a Mr. Protaske, was held in custody. No reason was given for the Communist action.

Christian Colleges in India to Be Studied

India (EPS)—Mrs. Douglas Horton, who returned this month from Asia where she visited Christian and government colleges in India, gave a report on the problems she found there to a meeting of the Committee for Southern Asia of the Division of Foreign Missions of the National Council of Churches, U.S.A.

This Committee has undertaken, at the request of the National Christian Council of India, a six-month study of current problems of Christian colleges in India. The study is to be headed by Dr. and Mrs. Arnold S. Nash, of the University of North Carolina, who will arrive in India in September for a session of teaching appointments, counselling and conferences.

In her report, Mrs. Horton said: "It is tremendously important for institutions founded by people of deep faith to be continued in India." She also stressed the importance of Christian leaders in non-Christian institutions, for the reason that they were making "definite contributions to India and to world peace." As one example she cited the Y.W.C.A. School of Social Work, in Delhi. She pointed out that certain Christian colleges which once looked to Britain for funds are now in a tragic financial situation. The difficulty of finding enough highly-trained Christian faculty members for the colleges is made even more acute by the financial crisis. Mrs. Horton suggested the establishment of an American board for united colleges in India and Pakistan, similar to the United Board for Christian Colleges in China.

The importance of the Christian colleges in India was underscored by statistics showing that since 1950 enrollment has grown by about a thousand students a year. In 1950 the 39 Christian colleges had less than 21,000 students; by 1951 they had more than 22,000; and in 1952 there were 41 colleges with more than 23,000 students, of whom nearly 85 percent were non-Christian.

Ecumenical Commission Raises "European Issues" of Cooperation

The Ecumenical Commission on European Cooperation has issued the first number of a new bulletin en-

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titled *European Issues*, with a lead article by Dr. W. A. Visser 't Hooft, General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, on "Can Europe Be Defended?" Enumerating first the Europe which "we cannot and do not want to defend," Dr. Visser 't Hooft mentions the Europe dominated by fear; the Europe that "hangs on blindly to its former privileges (and) refuses to realize that these privileges are not inscribed in the eternal order"; the Europe which "is ready to desert, (considering) its role in history as over"; a Europe made up of competing nationalisms; a Europe which "retreats into an ivory tower of finely developed culture"; and "an uprooted Europe which in novels, in plays and in films, shows that it has no moral inhibitions." But Dr. Visser 't Hooft also sees another side of Europe, "very precious, which we must neither scorn nor abandon and which we must protect at all costs." Among the assets of this Europe he lists the possi-

bility of free discussion (more so than in America at the moment); the independence of truth (unhampered as in Russia by political dogma); the possibility of a responsible life (one may even choose for or against Europe, and if choosing for it, does not commit himself to accepting its unworthy aspects); and a sense of proportion (which safeguards against totalitarianism).

But Dr. Visser 't Hooft warns, "We have not the smallest chance to save even a part if we continue to take a defensive attitude. . . . It is a question of finding a conquering and missionary faith that will create values and renew Europe. . . . It is possible that we shall discover, behind the chaotic history of our day, the history of God accomplishing His work through and also in spite of mankind. . . . Shall we defend Europe? No, rather live in Europe according to that God-given faith which has power to renew all things."

Also in this first issue, Roger Mehl discusses the problem of German rearmament (reprinted from the French *Foi et Vie*) and Professor Heinrich Bornkamm contributes an article on "Protestantism and Europe" (translated from the German *Sonntagsblatt*).

The Ecumenical Commission on European Cooperation, which publishes *European Affairs*, is an unofficial body made up of two or three laymen from each country of Europe who are concerned with Christian witness in relation to European cooperation and questions of European unity. Members represent a cross-section of political coloring and denominational adherence. The group has met twice yearly since 1950, and has frequently spoken out concerning what it considers Christian responsibility for concrete action in support of effective European integration.

European Issues will be published several times a year, in French, German and English.

We are happy to announce that in the future, the chairmanship of the Editorial Board will be jointly held by Dr. John Bennett and Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr.

Dr. Bennett has long been identified with the editorial policy of the paper and his election to co-chairmanship therefore formally recognizes what has been the actual situation for the past years.

Author In This Issue

Verne H. Fletcher is an American pastor doing research work in Paris, France. Although not officially a French neutralist, he sympathizes with the view that the "neutralist" position is a realistic alternative to present "Atlantic Politics" in Europe.

We neglected in introducing Dean Littell of Boston University, to inform our readers that the authority with which he wrote the article on German religious life, proceeds from three years of experience as Religious Affairs Officer of our Administration in Germany.

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